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ABSTRACT 
 
Computer network defense (CND) protects organizations and individuals against 
cyber threats by monitoring, identifying, analyzing, and defending network infrastructure 
from infiltration. Network defenders must maintain high levels of cyber situation 
awareness (CSA) in order to correctly identify and act on threats to the network. Intrusion 
detection systems (IDSs) are automated systems designed to assist network defenders in 
building CSA by sifting through network traffic and flagging potential threats. These 
systems are plagued by high false alarm rates that inhibit the ability of network defenders 
to build CSA. More capable IDSs have been developed that are capable of increasing the 
hit rate and lowering the false alarm rate by analyzing gathered network information. The 
influence of these IDS technologies on CSA has yet to be explored. 172 San Jose State 
University psychology students performed a signal detection task for intrusion detection 
to examine whether integrated automation with a multilayered analysis incorporating 
both liberal and conservative response criteria leads to better CSA than less-integrated, 
yet liberally responding automation (high hit rates and high false alarm rates) or 
conservatively responding automation (with low hit rates and low false alarm rates). The 
IDS condition was manipulated at three levels (liberal, conservative, both). The reliability 
of the IDSs was manipulated at three levels (60%, 80%, 95%). This study was unable to 
observe any differences in task performance or CSA for any of the conditions.   
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Introduction 
Statement of the Problem 
Computer network defense (CND) protects organizations and individuals against 
cyber threats by monitoring, identifying, analyzing, and defending network 
infrastructure from infiltration. Network defenders are required to distinguish actual 
threats to the network from normal network traffic, determine the nature of the threat, 
and decide how to respond (Sawyer et. al. 2014). Success at CND requires an extensive 
amount of goal-relevant awareness derived from information in the task environment, 
which has been labeled situation awareness (SA; Endsley, 1988). SA has been further 
adapted into the domain of cyber security and labeled cyber situation awareness (CSA; 
Champion, Rajivan, Cooke, & Jariwala, 2012; D'amico, Whitley, Tesone, O'Brien & 
Roth, 2005; Gutzwiller, Hunt, & Lange, 2016; Mahoney et. al, 2010; Onwubiko, 2009; 
2016). Building and maintaining CSA is essential for recognizing and responding to 
network threats (Jajodia, Liu, Swarup & Wang, 2010; Onwubiko & Owens, 2012).  
Intrusion detection systems (IDSs), a form of automation, have been designed to 
assist the network defender in monitoring network traffic. IDSs can help defenders build 
and maintain the awareness necessary to defend networks. For example, an IDS will run a 
scan on the number of users that have logged in and/or out at unusual times and present 
those data to the network defender. The data output might take different forms depending 
on the type of system. These forms will be described in further detail. Human-machine 
relationships are especially important to consider in the domain of CND because it is 
impossible for a human network defender to perform the task completely unaided, which 
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makes it impossible to completely divorce the human and machine components in CND 
from one another.  
Misuse-based IDS systems can only detect the threats they are programed to discover. 
The advantage of a Misuse-based system is that it is very effective at detecting known 
threats (Werlinger, Hawkey, Muldner, Jaferian & Beznosov, 2008). One of the 
disadvantages of a Misuse-based system is that it is incapable of detecting novel threats 
(Werlinger, Hawkey, Muldner, Jaferian & Beznosov, 2008).  
Anomaly-based systems monitor a network and are calibrated to the normal flow of 
network traffic on that specific network. If an element of user traffic deviates from the 
norm, it is flagged as a potential threat to the system. Anomaly-based systems are 
advantageous because it can potentially detect novel threats (Kemmerer & Vigna, 2002). 
However, not all abnormal traffic is malicious. Anomaly-based IDSs are incapable of 
making that distinction (Werlinger, Hawkey, Muldner, Jaferian & Beznosov, 2008), 
which leads to the primary disadvantage of an Anomaly-based system; it produces a vast 
number of false alarms that must be reconciled later by a human cyber defender 
(Mukkamala, Sung & Abraham, 2005).  
Efforts have been made to develop new, more capable IDSs that increase the hit rate 
and lower the false alarm rate by analyzing gathered network information. A popular 
approach is to integrate both misuse-based and anomaly-based systems together to 
combine the strengths of each type of system while compensating for their weaknesses 
(Kim, Lee & Kim, 2015). The approach is called a hybrid IDS. A hybrid IDS increases 
the level in which the IDS is involved in the task of CND. A hybrid IDS may increase or 
3 
   
  
reduce the CSA of cyber defenders depending on how these systems are designed and 
implemented. Research on how the hybrid approach influences the CSA of human 
network defenders would inform the design of these new systems to optimize 
performance outcomes. As hybrid systems are relatively new and have limited 
deployment in the field, research in this area has yet to be conducted.  
As IDSs are a form of automation, previous research examining how level of 
automation (LOA) influences the SA and decision making of human operators may be 
applicable in the cyber domain. SA can benefit from the use of diagnostic aiding tools 
(Goodrich et. al. 2007; Horrey & Wickens, 2001; Rudisill, 2000). However, under 
conditions in which the human and automation operate more independently, increasing 
the LOA can lead to detriments in performance outcomes (Kaber & Endsley, 2000; Ruff, 
Narayanan, and Draper, 2002).  
It is imperative that we improve the CSA of cyber defenders and help them overcome 
the challenges inhibiting the discrimination of actual threats from false alarms when 
using an IDS. We must understand whether integrated automation with a multilayered 
analysis incorporating both liberal and conservative response criteria leads to better CSA 
than less-integrated, yet liberally responding automation (high hit rates and high false 
alarm rates), or conservatively responding automation (with low hit rates and low false 
alarm rates). 
Situation Awareness and Cyber Situation Awareness 
Situation awareness (SA) arose as a scientific construct when researchers began 
studying the source of pilot errors, but it is a broadly applicable skill (Harwood, Barnett, 
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& Wickens, 1988). SA is an essential skill in the effective operation of a complex, 
dynamic system (Endsley, 1995). SA can be described as task-relevant knowledge 
(Endsley, 1988). Endsley (1988) highlighted SA as occurring in three stages. Stage one is 
perception, in which information in the task environment is perceived by the operator via 
the senses and diagnostic tools. Stage two involves the integration and organization of the 
information into a meaningful structure. Stage two is called information comprehension. 
Stage three is projection, in which the operator uses the information structure to project a 
future outcome and plan future behavior (Endsley 1988). Failures can occur within any of 
these stages, resulting in poor SA and subsequent task performance. Sources of these 
failures can be attributed to high workload, poor sensing, and unreliability in automated 
tools used to aid task performance (Parasuraman, Sheridan & Wickens, 2008). 
SA is a domain-specific construct best studied in the context in which it operates 
(Flach, 2015). As CND is a highly complex dynamic system, the construct of SA has 
been adapted to this domain. The components of SA as they pertain to CND have been 
identified and labeled as CSA. The three-stage model still applies, but the task-relevant 
knowledge is specific to CND (Onwubiko, 2009; 2016). CSA has been refined more 
recently into cyber cognitive situation awareness (CCSA; Gutzwiller, Hunt, & Lange, 
2016). According to this model, defenders must maintain awareness of a multitude of 
network attributes (network health, status, network architecture, typical traffic), their role 
in the team structure (their task, their teammates task, and how they relate to the 
superordinate goal), and knowledge of the global security landscape (previous hacks, 
active attackers, attack profiles, political relations) to be proficient in CND (Champion, 
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Rajivan, Cooke, & Jariwala, 2012; D'amico, Whitley, Tesone, O'Brien & Roth, 2005; 
Mahoney et. al, 2010).  
Reliability of Automation 
Reliability is commonly defined as the percentage to which an automated system can 
perform a desired task successfully (Singh, Tiwari & Singh, 2009). In general, 
automation reliability and human performance tend to have a positive relationship, 
wherein highly reliable automation leads to better task performance. This effect has been 
found frequently in the literature in regard to signal detection tasks similar to that in CND 
(Madhavan & Phillips, 2010; Dixon, Wickens, & McCarley 2006). Conversely, as 
reliability declines, so does human performance. Wickens and Dixon (2007) identified 
that performance declines because the human must expend extra cognitive effort to sort 
through erroneous information to successfully complete the task.  
Reliance on automation and task demand have been found to be moderating variables 
between reliability and task performance (Wickens & Dixon 2007). Wickens & Dixon 
point out that operators in positions of high task demand rely heavily on automation 
despite their awareness of its low reliability level. In CND, due to the volume and speed 
of data, human network defenders are in a position in which they cannot perform the task 
unaided. As task demands and reliance on the IDS are high in CND, network defenders 
may be likely to rely on automation regardless of whether it is reliable or not.     
Levels of Automation and SA in CND 
Automation is the execution of a task by a machine agent (Parasuraman, 1997). 
Levels of automation (LOA) describe how and to what extent the automation is involved 
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in a task (Parasuraman, Sheridan & Wickens, 2000; Sheridan & Verplank, 1978). There 
are multiple taxonomies of LOA (Kaber & Endsley, 1999; Sheridan & Verplank, 1978). 
This study focuses on the levels of diagnostic aiding (Parasuraman, Sheridan & Wickens, 
2000); Wickens & Dixon, 2007). Of these levels, the first is information acquisition. At 
the first level, the automation gathers information about the task environment and 
presents it to the human agent. The second level is information analysis. The second level 
refers to when the automation performs an analysis of the data and presents the results to 
the human agent. The two levels of diagnostic aiding also correspond to the first two 
levels of Endsley’s model of SA, in which information acquisition and information 
analysis are similar to perception and comprehension (Schuster, 2013; Horrey et. al. 
2009). In the perception level of SA, information about the task environment is gathered 
via the senses. The task information is then integrated with existing knowledge structures 
to form a complex analysis of the problem space at the comprehension level. Level 1 
automation (information acquisition) gathers information from the task environment and 
organizes it for presentation. At the information analysis level, the automation will cross-
check this new information with old information and present the information in an 
integrated form. For example, a hybrid IDS will examine the network architecture for 
anomalous traffic (information acquisition), compare it with what it is programed to 
consider normative network behavior, and flag any deviations as potential threats 
(information analysis). A hybrid IDS system that implements anomaly-based and misuse-
based detection in succession would essentially be performing both information 
acquisition and information analysis.  
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Effects of Level of Automation on SA and Performance 
SA is typically shown to increase as LOA increases from level 1 (information 
acquisition) to level 2 (information analysis) by reducing the cognitive workload of the 
human at the expense of the richness of the information provided (Horrey & Wickens, 
2001). At higher stages, the human is further abstracted from relevant data about the 
problem, which leads to situations in which increasing the LOA decreases SA as opposed 
to raising it further (Ruff, Narayanan, and Draper, 2002). However, layering the 
automation so that level 1 information is provided along with level 2 analysis leads to 
better performance and SA (Dexter, Willemsen-Dunlap, & Lee, 2007).  
However, operators only have better performance in conditions in which the 
automation does not make an error. When the automation does make an error, the SA of 
the human operator may be reduced (Dexter et. al. 2007). Human operators rely on the 
automation and trust that the information they acted on was correct, which leads to an 
increase in errors if the information provided by the automation was incorrect. This effect 
suggests that not only is SA sensitive to the LOA, but it is also sensitive to the reliability 
of the information provided by the automation. This relationship is especially important 
to consider in CND where network defenders are highly dependent on the IDS 
automation to obtain information about network threats.  
Reliability and Level of Automation   
Automated systems that incorporate diagnostic aiding have been shown to improve 
performance of human operators on tasks (Goodrich et. al, 2007). This effect is 
strengthened when the automation is reliable (Madhaven & Philips, 2010). Furthermore, 
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research suggests that unreliable automation can have different effects on operator SA 
depending on the level of diagnostic aiding being implemented. When compared to 
automation employing solely information acquisition, automation employing information 
analysis has been shown to have more negative impact on SA when information is 
unreliable (Rovira, McGarry, & Parasuraman, 2007; Sarter & Schroeder, 2001). 
Similarly, anomaly-based IDSs that only flag potential threats and present them to the 
network defender (information acquisition) have the potential to reduce the CSA of a 
network defender when false alarm rates are very high. False alarms have been shown to 
be more damaging to SA than misses (Dixon, Wickens & McCarley, 2006). This effect is 
particularly impactful for anomaly-based IDSs because they are calibrated with a more 
liberal response criterion to capture more anomalous network traffic, but produce more 
false alarms. 
Unreliability in IDSs can better be explained in terms of signal detection theory 
(SDT; Swets & Pickett, 1982). IDSs are essentially alarm systems. To most effectively 
build SA, a decision criterion must be chosen for the IDS that optimizes how liberal or 
conservative it is when determining the alerting threshold (Kuchar, 1996). Ensuring 
performance means that the probability that an alarm reflects an actual attack must be 
increased as much as possible (Parasuraman, Hancock & Olofinboba, 1997).  
Signal Detection in Cyber Security  
Signal detection theory (SDT) has applications in cyber security. Intrusion detection 
systems perform signal detection when scanning network traffic and flagging alerts 
(Mukkamala, Sung & Abraham, 2005). These systems attempt to differentiate potentially 
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malicious network traffic (signal) from the mass flow of normal network traffic (noise). 
In the context of CND, a hit would be flagging an actual threat, a false alarm would be 
flagging a non-threat as a threat, a miss would be failing to flag an actual threat, and a 
correct rejection would be not flagging a non-threat.  
 Anomalous network traffic is flagged and presented to a cyber network defender. 
However, not all abnormal network traffic is malicious. Once the flagged traffic has been 
presented to the cyber defender, he/she must make the distinction between the true alerts 
and false alarms. This task requires enough information from the task environment and 
other sources to help the cyber defender produce a keen awareness of the situation in 
order to make the correct decisions of how to respond (Sawyer et. al. 2014).  
Intrusion Detection Systems 
One aspect of CND involves continuous monitoring of network traffic to discriminate 
anomalous patterns from nominal traffic throughout complex computer networks. This is 
an impossible task for a human to perform unaided. IDSs have been developed to assist in 
making these discriminations. Network defenders use information provided by IDSs to 
make decisions about how to respond to potential attacks.  
Misuse-based IDSs are the oldest of these systems (Kemmerer & Vigna, 2002). These 
systems are programed to search for specific threats to the network. These types of 
systems use pre-determined search criteria to evaluate whether or not patterns of traffic in 
the network characterizes an attack. Thus, this type of IDS performs information analysis 
(Wickens & Dixon, 2007). This tool is characterized by low hit rates because it is only 
capable of detecting attacks it is designed to search for. However, this programming also 
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means misuse-based systems have low false alarm rates because they do not often flag 
non-threats. Misuse-based systems are efficient at detecting known threats they are 
programed to detect. However, these types of systems are incapable of detecting 
previously-unseen threats. As attacks are always evolving, this makes the effective miss 
rate very high (Werlinger, Hawkey, Muldner, Jaferian & Beznosov, 2008). When novel 
attack types occur, network defenders must identify and respond to the threat manually. 
Afterward, network defenders must update the IDS to search for that attack type in the 
future. As hackers are constantly finding novel ways to circumvent these systems, 
network defenders are always a step behind the attackers.  
Anomaly-based IDSs were developed in response to the limitations of misuse-based 
IDSs. These systems sort through network data, flag potentially malicious network 
events, and report these events to the human network defender for interpretation 
(McHugh, Christie, & Allen, 2000). This automation performs level 1 diagnostic aiding 
(information acquisition; Wickens & Dixon, 2007). These serve to make the information 
required to complete the task more salient and available to the network defender. As 
anomaly-based IDSs are effective at differentiating between normal and abnormal 
network traffic, these systems can detect a greater variety of threats to the network at the 
cost of high false alarm rates. This trade-off illustrates that in the eyes of a network 
defender, even though the miss rate for this type of IDS is very low, the high false alarm 
rate obscures the actual threats (Mukkamala, Sung & Abraham, 2005).  
Hybrid systems are an approach to balance out the strengths and weaknesses of 
misuse-based and anomaly-based systems (Aydin, Zaim & Ceylan, 2008). Some of these 
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systems attempt to layer misuse-based and anomaly-based systems in succession (Bronte, 
2016; Tesfahun & Bhaskari, 2015). Other attempts involve machine learning or statistical 
analysis to narrow in on what attack vector anomalous code represents (Peddabachigari, 
Abraham, Grosan & Thomas, 2007). These systems have lower false alarm rates and 
higher hit rates than using either of the previous systems individually (Aydin, Zaim & 
Ceylan, 2008). As these systems integrate both anomaly-based and misuse-based 
systems, hybrid systems can be considered to perform both information acquisition and 
information analysis (Wickens & Dixon, 2007). 
Research Need 
Although research has been conducted on SA in automated systems, the extent to 
which the level of diagnostic aiding and reliability of the automation interact to influence 
the SA of the operator in CND has yet to be examined. The present research varied levels 
of reliability as well as levels of diagnostic aiding to explore how the effectiveness of 
diagnostic aiding changes with respect to different levels of reliability.  
Although research has been conducted on how reliability and level of automation 
influence the SA of human operators (Goodrich et. al, 2007; Madhaven & Philips, 2010; 
Rovira, McGarry, & Parasuraman, 2007; Sarter & Schroeder, 2001), currently no studies 
have examined this relationship in the domain of cyber security. This study tested these 
constructs in this new domain and examined how they can be modified for application in 
cyber systems while adding to knowledge of human-automation interaction generally. 
Although IDS systems are commonly used, an insufficient amount of empirical 
testing has been conducted on how people use and interact with these systems (Werlinger 
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et. al. 2008). This research provides empirical evidence for how people interact with 
these systems in controlled conditions by varying the reliability of the IDS and the extent 
to which the IDS is involved in the decision making.  
Literature on IDS development has proposed hybrid IDSs as a viable method for 
detecting threats (Aydin, Zaim & Ceylan, 2008). However, this proposition has only been 
validated by assessing the hybrid IDS’s increased ability to detect certain attack types 
over previous systems (Tesfahun & Bhaskari, 2015). Furthermore, the literature has yet 
to examine how human network defenders perform using these types of systems.  
The most recent methodology for developing a Hybrid IDS layered the misuse-based 
IDS (information analysis) prior to the anomaly-based IDS (information acquisition) in 
the processing stream (Kim, Lee & Kim, 2015). Based on previous literature on levels of 
automation and a novel definition of hybrid IDSs (information acquisition followed by 
information analysis), this study tested whether this method would improve the CSA of 
network defenders beyond what other systems can achieve. 
Purpose of this Research 
The purpose of this study was to explore the moderating effects of level of diagnostic 
aiding and automation reliability on the human ability to build CSA in CND. The 
strengths and limitations of IDSs led to the conditions in this applied study. Specifically, 
the study examined whether hybrid (both information acquisition and information 
analysis) automation with a multilayered analysis incorporating both liberal and 
conservative response criterion leads to better CSA than both anomaly-based (only 
information acquisition) systems with liberal response criterion (high hit rate, and high 
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false alarm rates) and misuse-based (information analysis) systems with conservative 
response criterion (low hit rates and low false alarm rate)].  
Hypotheses 
Based on previous literature with respect to diagnostic aiding and its influence on SA, 
there was reason to expect that SA would increase with more machine agent assistance in 
instances of high reliability (Goodrich et. al, 2007; Madhaven & Philips, 2010). In these 
instances, human agents correctly make their decisions regarding task completion based 
on the information provided by the automation. Since the reliability of the IDS is 
sufficiently high in these situations, the human network defender should be able to rely 
more heavily on the accuracy of the information provided by the automation. At the same 
time, it was reasonable to expect that human network defenders would refer to the 
automation more often in situations of high reliability and would have higher CSA when 
performing the task. 
Furthermore, because the analysis information provided by the hybrid IDS can be 
verified by examining log files, it was reasonable to expect that higher levels of 
diagnostic aiding would lead to higher CSA. This relationship would translate into more 
successful discrimination between true security alerts and false alarms, which led to the 
hypothesis that hybrid IDS systems would lead to higher CSA.  
Because the stages of diagnostic aiding (Wickens & Dixon, 2007) map onto 
Endsley’s first two levels of SA (Schuster, 2013), diagnostic aiding that performs both 
information analysis and information acquisition would allow the human network 
defender to develop significantly more CSA than information acquisition without 
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analysis (Schuster, 2013). As hybrid IDSs are characterized by performing both 
information acquisition and analysis, the following hypotheses were formed:  
H1a. Hybrid IDS (information acquisition then analysis) will lead to higher CSA than 
anomaly-based (information acquisition), 
H1b. Hybrid IDS (information acquisition then analysis) will lead to higher CSA than 
misuse-based (information analysis). 
When automation is imperfect, information relevant to the task environment that is 
presented to the human agent contains errors, which makes it more difficult for the 
human to make correct decisions about how to proceed with the task. In these situations, 
it was reasonable to expect that the CSA of human defenders would be significantly 
decreased because they would have to expend more time and cognitive resources sifting 
through errors to make correct decisions. As misuse-based systems tend to present the 
results of their analyses without the raw data used in their analysis, it was reasonable to 
expect that participants would rely on the automation more heavily in this condition and 
make more frequent errors along with the automation. Below are the following 
hypotheses. 
H2a: Misuse-based IDS (information analysis) will lead to higher levels of CSA of 
the human network defender than anomaly-based IDS (information acquisition). 
H2b. Misuse-based IDS (information analysis) will lead to lower CSA than Hybrid 
IDS (information acquisition and analysis).  
False alarms have been shown to be more damaging to SA than misses (Dixon, 
Wickens & McCarley, 2006). This effect is particularly impactful for anomaly-based 
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IDSs, as they are typically calibrated with a more liberal response criterion that captures 
more anomalous network traffic, but produces more false alarms. As anomaly-based 
IDSs present raw information to the defender without any form of analysis to sift through 
false alarms, anomaly-based systems will produce the lowest levels of CSA because 
human defenders will not have the assistance of the automation in any capacity. Below 
are the following hypotheses. 
H3a. Anomaly-based IDS (information acquisition will lead to lower CSA than 
Hybrid IDS (information acquisition and analysis). 
H3b. Anomaly-based IDS (information acquisition) will lead to lower CSA than 
misuse-based IDSs (information analysis). 
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Method 
Participants 
Participants consisted of 172 individuals, 64 males and 106 females, aged 18 to 50 
years. Two participants chose not to disclose their gender. The average age of 
participants was 18.79 (SD = 2.76). Participants were recruited from the population of 
General Psychology students at San José State University via SONA systems. A power 
analysis conducted in G*power for a 3 x 3 factorial ANOVA with a medium effect size f 
= .25, α = .05, and power = .8 revealed that 158 participants were required to have 
sufficient power for analysis. Participants were compensated with course credit. 
Materials 
The mock IDS (Figure 1) was a program written in Visual Basic .NET that 
displayed simulated network traffic to the participant. It served as a low-fidelity proxy for 
an IDS and was used to simulate how network defenders interact with these systems. On 
the left side of the screen, simulated network traffic scrolled at a constant rate. This 
content was the same across all conditions. On the right side of the window, simulated 
alerts from one of three automation conditions were presented. The number of simulated 
alerts was the same across conditions. However, the alerts changed depending on the 
reliability of the automation because the automation made errors. Sometimes simulated 
alerts were flagged distractors instead of threats. In other instances, threats remained in 
the simulated network traffic screen and not flagged to the simulated alerts screen.   
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Network traffic log events contained distractors in the form of user activity such as: 
“User# login.”, “User# logout.”, “User# sent message to user#.”, and “New user 
registration.” Log events also contained threats. There were three types of threats with 
corresponding log events. A virus corresponded to the log event “Item deleted.” A worm 
was associated with the log event “Message sent to user.” A brute force attack could be 
recognized by the log event “Unknown user login.”    
Participants were tasked with distinguishing threats from distractors and specifying 
the attack type. Participants made this decision by selecting one of the three options on a 
button array above the log viewer. Participants could click the brute button to indicate a 
brute force attack, the worm button for a worm attack, and the virus button for a virus 
attack. Participants had to make this decision as soon as they observed the log event. Log 
events were 2-3 seconds apart. Once a new log was presented, the click would be in 
reference to that newest log event. Once a log has passed, participants were unable to flag 
that event as a threat. The intent of this constraint was to create a sense of urgency to the 
task and encourage focus. 
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 Figure 1. An image of the mock IDS 
Manipulations 
Intrusion detection system. As response criterion is an intrinsic property of each 
IDS (Aydin, Zaim & Ceylan, 2008; Mukkamala, Sung & Abraham, 2005; Werlinger, 
Hawkey, Muldner, Jaferian & Beznosov, 2008), it varied along with IDS, which resulted 
in three conditions: a hybrid IDS with a multilayered use of liberal and conservative 
response criterion, a misuse-based IDS with a conservative criterion (low hit rate, low 
false alarm rate), and an anomaly-based IDS with a liberal criterion (high hit rate, high 
false alarm rate). 
Network log events could be displayed in one of three ways, depending on condition. 
In the anomaly-based condition, the network log event was displayed by itself (item 
deleted). In the misuse-based condition, the corresponding attack type was displayed by 
itself (virus). In the hybrid condition, both were displayed (item deleted – virus). The 
19 
   
  
presentation of the attacks was consistent within condition whether the log event was 
displayed in the simulated network traffic screen or the simulated alert screen. 
Reliability. The reliability of the IDSs was manipulated at three levels (60%, 80%, 
95%). We chose 60% to represent a low level of reliability because it has been 
determined to be the lower bound of a 95% confidence interval in which automation can 
still be effective (Wickens & Dixon, 2007). The reason that 95% was chosen was to 
represent a high, yet imperfect, level of reliability, which was expected to prevent 
participants from adopting a strategy of completely trusting the automation. 80% was 
chosen as a median for the reliability level factor. 
The IDS could make three types of errors. It could flag a distractor to the simulated 
alert screen, fail to flag a threat to the simulated alert screen, or perform an incorrect 
analysis in the form of misattributing an attack to the distractor log instead of the proper 
corresponding log. For example, since the correct log event for a virus is “item deleted” 
the IDS could flag this as a worm in error. These error types were distributed equally 
across reliability conditions. 
The reliability represented the proportion of log entries that were incorrectly 
interpreted by the automation in the trial. The conditions were created by calculating the 
ratio of errors to total number of log events and making sure that ratio corresponded to 
the three reliability levels. In this study, the total number of events in all conditions 
including both threats and distractors was 542. Of those events, there were 153 attacks 
(51 worms, 51 viruses, 51 brutes). This breakdown was consistent across all conditions. 
In the 60% reliability condition, 217 of 542 events (40%) were misinterpreted by the 
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automation; that is, if the event was anomalous, it would be labeled as normal. If the 
event was normal, it would be labeled as anomalous. The process was repeated for each 
reliability level across all levels of the IDS variable. 
Measures 
SAGAT. The situation awareness global assessment technique (SAGAT) is a global 
measure designed to access the cognitive elements of SA within a task environment 
(Endsley, 1988; Endsley, 2000). During the task, the simulation would freeze at 
unexpected moments in which the participant was asked random questions from a battery 
about the task environment. Participants’ responses were based on knowledge obtained 
from the task environment prior to the freeze. SA was assessed via the type and 
correctness of these responses in order to obtain what task relevant knowledge might be 
available to the participant at that time and how it is organized in their minds (Endsley, 
1995). In this study, questions were only asked at the perception and comprehension 
levels of SA because the task had no projection components that were expected to affect 
performance. The task did not require participants to project to future outcomes because 
they were only required to distinguish threats in real time.  
Although participants were not able to predict when the freezes would occur, all 
participants were asked questions at the same fixed points in the simulation. This part of 
the procedure was to ensure that questions had similar correct answers at those points to 
serve as effective comparisons between participants. Participants were not told that those 
questions would be asked, or when. However, participants were instructed to pay 
attention to the content on which they would be quizzed.  
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Task performance. For this study, task performance was defined as the ability of 
participants to escalate potential network threats. The performance of the participants was 
determined by calculating d’ from the ratio of hits to false alarms. As for the evaluation 
criteria for performance success, a hit was a successful escalation of a malicious network 
traffic string. A miss was a failure to escalate an actual threat. A false alarm would be the 
escalation of a network anomaly that is not malicious. A correct rejection was 
successfully not flagging normal network traffic. 
Level of confidence. Between the training and actual task, participants were asked to 
rate their level of confidence with the task and their potential for success on a scale of 1 – 
10 (1 being not very confident and 10 being very confident). Participants were asked, 
“On a scale of 1 – 10 (1 being not very confident and 10 being very confident) how 
would you rate your level of confidence in your performance on the task?” The purpose 
of this measure was to ascertain participants’ expectations of their performance on the 
upcoming task.  
Level of difficulty. After completing the task, participants were asked to rate the 
perceived level of difficulty of the task on a scale of 1 – 10 (1 being very easy 10 being 
very difficult). Participants were asked, “On a scale of 1 – 10 (1 being very easy 10 being 
very difficult) how would you rate the level of difficulty of the task?” This questions was 
intended to determine how difficult the task was for them to complete. 
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Demographic questionnaire. A short survey was administered prior to the task to 
obtain demographic information about the participants, as well as ascertain their 
perceived aptitude with usage of technology. These included age, gender, and self-report 
measures on a 1 – 9 scale (1 being not knowledgeable and 9 being very knowledgeable) 
about computer competency, familiarity with mobile technology, knowledge of internet 
usage, and basic knowledge of cyber security. For computer competency, participants 
were asked the following question: “On a scale of 1-9 (with 1 being not knowledgeable 
and 9 being very knowledgeable), how would you rate your level of aptitude with 
computers?” For aptitude with mobile technology, participants were asked: “On a scale 
of 1-9 (with 1 being not knowledgeable and 9 being very knowledgeable), how would 
you rate your level of aptitude with mobile technology?” To assess self-reports of internet 
usage, participants were asked: “On a scale of 1-9 (with 1 being not knowledgeable and 9 
being very knowledgeable), how would you rate your level of aptitude with internet 
usage?” Finally, to assess perceived competence with cyber security, participants were 
asked the following: “On a scale of 1-9 (with 1 being not knowledgeable and 9 being 
very knowledgeable), how would you rate your level of confidence in cyber security?” 
Procedure 
Participants were recruited through SONA systems and brought into a lab space in the 
Department of Psychology at San José State University. The entire duration of the study 
was 30 minutes. In the first 10 minutes, participants were provided with an informed 
consent form and instructed on the procedure of the experiment. Participants were seated 
in front of the computer and asked to complete a brief demographic questionnaire 
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administered on Qualtrics. Next, participants were briefed on the details of the task. 
Participants were instructed to escalate potential attacks using their best judgement and 
information provided by the IDS. Participants were asked to complete a 5-minute training 
exercise to get familiar with interacting with the IDS identifying anomalies in the 
network traffic, flagging them and escalating. Once complete, the participants were asked 
to rate their level of confidence with their understanding of the task from a scale of 1 – 10 
(1 not confident and 10 being extremely confident). Next, participants were informed 
about the functional properties and reliability of the IDS systems they were to be working 
with. Each participant completed one 15-minute session featuring a particular IDS system 
(anomaly based, misuse based, or hybrid based). Three times per session, the program 
was paused at predetermined points during the session and participants were presented a 
question about the current state of the task environment. This question was randomly 
selected from a pre-written battery of task-relevant questions about the current state of 
the system. Participants were scored on correct responses to the questions. Lastly, 
participants were debriefed.  
Design 
The independent variables (IV) in the study were type of automation (anomaly-based 
IDS, misuse-based IDS, and hybrid IDS) and reliability (60%, 80%, 95%). The primary 
dependent variables were CSA and task performance. CSA was represented by the 
percentage of correct SAGAT scores. Task performance was measured by d’. Data were 
analyzed using SPSS version 25. Two 3 x 3 factorial Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
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tests were conducted, one with SAGAT scores as the dependent variable (DV) and the 
second with d’ as the DV. All factors were between-subjects factors.  
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Results 
Self-Reported Measures 
Across the demographic survey, one response was left blank on the mobile 
technology knowledge question and the cyber security knowledge question by one 
participant. This omission was due to an error in the survey design that allowed 
participants to continue without responding to a question. The descriptive statistics for 
the self-reported measures are presented below (Table 1). 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Self-report Measures of Knowledge of Mobile Technology, 
Computers, Internet Usage, and Cyber Security 
 
Variable 
 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
skewness/SE 
 
kurtosis/SE 
 
n 
Mobile 
 
6.61 1.42 -0.72/.18 .013/.37 171 
Computer 
 
5.6 1.61 -0.49/.18 -0.06/.37 172 
Internet 
 
6.42 1.49 -0.16/.18 -0.43/.37 172 
Cyber 
Security 
 
4.2 1.8 0.24/.18 -0.52/.37 171 
 
When participants were asked about their knowledge of mobile technology and its 
usage, participants tended to rate themselves near 7, forming a negatively skewed 
distribution (M = 6.61, SD = 1.42, skewness = -0.72, SE = .18, kurtosis = 0.13, SE = .37, 
n = 171). The negative skewness indicates that participants tended to perceive themselves 
to be relatively knowledgeable about mobile technology. When asked about their 
knowledge of computer usage, participants rated themselves near 6 (M = 5.6, SD = 1.61, 
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skewness = -0.49, SE = .18, kurtosis = -0.06, SE = .37, n = 172). The negative skewness 
indicates that participants generally view themselves as moderately knowledgeable about 
computer usage. Most participants asked about their familiarity with internet usage rated 
themselves above a score of 5. The mode of this scale was 6 at 49 responses with a 
negative skew (M = 6.42, SD = 1.49, skewness = -0.16, SE = .18, kurtosis = -0.43, SE = 
.37, n = 172). The negative skewness indicates that participants generally tended to view 
themselves as knowledgeable about internet browsing and usage. However, participants 
tended to rate their knowledge of cyber security below a rating of 5. The mode of this 
scale was 5 at 37 responses. The average scores here dip compared to the others with a 
positive skew (M = 4.2, SD = 1.8, skewness = 0.24, SE = .18, kurtosis = -0.52, SE = .37, n 
= 171). The positive skewness indicates that participants tended to view themselves as 
less knowledgeable about matters related to cyber security. These combined results 
indicate that participants had a relatively firm grasp about knowledge of mobile 
technology, computers in general, and internet usage. However, participants tended to 
report themselves as much less knowledgeable about cyber security.   
For the results related to the self-report measures of confidence and difficulty, it is 
important to mention that the following statistics are reported with missing data. The 
confidence scores are missing 4% of responses and have an n = 168. Difficulty scores are 
missing 8% of responses with an n = 158. The relatively large amount of missing data 
justified a test for whether the confidence and difficulty data was missing completely at 
random, as the missing data could impact the results. A Little’s MCAR test (Little, 1988) 
was conducted for confidence and difficulty. The null hypothesis was not rejected for 
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confidence (24, n = 165) = 29.1, p = .22, or for difficulty χ2(24, n = 158) = 29.1, p = .22, 
indicating that missing data were missing at random. Participants tended to report their 
confidence level with the task above a score of 5. Most participants rated themselves as 5, 
6, or 7 with frequencies of 34, 34, and 37, respectively (M = 6.0, SD = 1.56, skewness = -
0.34, SE = .19, kurtosis = -0.36, SE = .38, n = 165), indicating that participants viewed 
themselves as relatively confident they would perform well on the task after the training, 
and understood the nature of the task. After the task was completed, participants tended 
to rate the task difficulty above a score of 5. Most participants rated the difficulty a 7 or 8 
out of 10 with recorded responses being 45 and 31, respectively. The descriptive statistics 
indicate that once the task was completed, participants tended to look back on the task as 
relatively difficult (M = 6.5, SD = 1.82, skewness = -0.64, SE = .19, kurtosis = 0.46, SE = 
.38, n = 158).   
Alternatively, these results suggest a Dunning-Kruger effect (Schlösser, Dunning, 
Johnson & Kruger, 2013). This effect is observed when a novice overestimates his or her 
ability to perform a task when learning a new skill because novices are incapable of 
grasping the nuances that mastery requires. Once novices obtain a higher level of skill, 
confidence decreases. As the novice gains enough task knowledge to reach intermediate 
level, he or she begins to understand how much more knowledge is required to attain true 
mastery. This results in a parabolic confidence curve in which confidence is high at 
beginner level, decreases at intermediate level, and returns once mastery is attained. In 
the context of this study, participants underwent a 5 min training course during which the 
experimenter walked them through the task. Afterwards, participants rated their 
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confidence as high. As participants became more familiar with the task and the true 
difficulty of the task was revealed, their confidence may have decreased. This 
relationship may explain the high reports of perceived task difficulty after the study was 
completed.  
SAGAT Measure of SA 
A 3 (anomaly-based, misuse-based, hybrid) x 3 (60%, 80%, 95%) factorial ANOVA 
on IDS type and reliability was conducted for the SAGAT data percent correct. 
Descriptive statistics are presented in the table below (Table 2). The bar chart below 
depicts the differences in means between conditions for percent correct of SAGAT scores 
(Figure 2). The analysis revealed no significant main effects for type of automation, F(2, 
163) = .15, p = .86, partial η2 = .002 β = .06, or reliability F(2, 163) = 0.04, p = .96, 
partial η2 = .001, β = .07. These main effects were not qualified by a significant 
interaction, F(4, 163) = 0.87, p = .48, partial η2 = .02, β = .27. These results indicate that 
this study cannot conclude that any observable difference in impact to participant CSA 
exists between the different intrusion detections systems tested, their affiliated criterions, 
or the reliability settings.  
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Figure 2. Means for percent correct of SAGAT  
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Percent Correct of SAGAT Scores 
 
Variable 
 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
skewness/SE 
 
kurtosis/SE 
 
n 
Type of 
Automation 
 
1.0 0.13 2.15/.19 3.59/.37 172 
Reliability 
 
78.43 14.39 -0.18/.19 -1.51/.37 172 
Age 
 
18.79 2.76 9.21/.19 98.73/.37 172 
Percent 
Correct 
 
0.05 0.13 2.15/.19 3.59/.37 172 
 
Performance (d’) 
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A 3 (anomaly-based, misuse-based, hybrid) x 3 (60%, 80%, 95%) factorial ANOVA 
between IDS type and reliability was conducted for d’. Descriptive statistics are 
presented in the table below (Table 3). The bar chart below depicts the differences in 
means between conditions for task performance (Figure 3). The analysis revealed no 
significant main effects for type of automation, F(2, 163) = 1.03 , p = .36, partial η2 = 
.01, β = .23, or reliability, F(2, 163) = 0.12, p = .89, partial η2 = .001, β = .07. These main 
effects were not qualified by a significant interaction, F(4, 163) = 1.46, p = .22, partial η2 
= .035, β = .45. These results indicate that this study cannot conclude that any observable 
difference in impact to participant CSA exists between the different intrusion detections 
systems tested, their affiliated criterions, or the reliability settings. 
 
Figure 3. Means for task performance 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics for Task Performance 
 
Variable 
 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
skewness/SE 
 
kurtosis/SE 
 
n 
Type of 
Automation 
 
1.0 0.82 0.0/.18 -1.5/.37 172 
Reliability 
 
78.34 1.09 -0.18/.18 -1.5/.37 172 
d’ 
 
.72 1.13 -0.37/.19 -0.83/.37 172 
 
Below are the means for the performance calculations (Table 4) and a projection of 
expected performance of participants across conditions (Table 5). As the hybrid IDS 
layers misuse-based analysis on top of anomaly-based information gathering, multiplying 
the miss rates of each will give us a probability of how hybrid systems are expected to 
perform. The miss rates for misuse and anomaly-based systems were multiplied to obtain 
a projection for what the hybrid criterion values should be in an ideal state. These could 
be compared to the observed values from participants. As displayed, the actual observed 
miss rates for the hybrid condition are higher than the projected value. The small negative 
values suggest participants underperformed from the expected. This finding is not 
surprising as the ANOVA results were not significant.  
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Table 4 
Means for Sensitivity, Bias, Criterion, Hit Rates, and False Alarm Rates Across 
Conditions. 
 
Variable 
 
 
 d’ 
 
Beta 
 
C 
 
Hit 
 
FA 
60% 
 
.77 2.91 -0.86 .39 .15 
80% 
 
.67 2.72 -0.85 .37 .18 
95% 
 
.73 2.59 -0.96 .36 .16 
Misuse 
 
.47 2.54 -1.11 .27 .15 
Anomaly .49 3.15 -.72 .45 .16 
Hybrid .69 2.52 -.87 .38 .17 
 
Table 5 
Projected Criterion for Hybrid Condition Compared with Actual Observed Values. 
 
Variable 
 
 
M 
Misuse 
misses 
 
M 
Anomaly 
misses 
 
Projected M 
Hybrid misses 
 
Observed M Hybrid 
misses 
 
Difference 
60% 
 
0.65 0.56 0.36 0.63 -.027 
80% 
 
0.77 0.56 0.43 0.55 -0.12 
95% 
 
0.71 0.54 0.38 0.67 -0.29 
 
Average criterion for the participants was calculated between the reliability 
conditions to see if their own individual criterion would be affected by reliability. The 
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equation used was the normal distribution function -.5*(NORMSINV(hits) + 
NORMSINV(false alarms)). This calculation was performed on the 60%, 80%, 95% 
reliability conditions. The outputs for these calculations were as follows: for 60% the 
output was 0.67; for 80% the output was 0.63; for 95% it was 0.67. These results suggests 
that the average participant criterion was a bit lower for the 80% condition.  
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Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to explore the moderating effects of level of diagnostic 
aiding and automation reliability on the human ability to build CSA in CND. 
Specifically, this study examined whether hybrid (information acquisition and 
information analysis) automation with multilayered analysis incorporating both liberal 
and conservative response criterion lead to better CSA than anomaly-based (information 
acquisition) systems with liberal response criterion (high hit rate, high false alarm rates) 
or misuse-based (information analysis) systems with conservative response criterion (low 
hit rate, low false alarm rates). As the results are inconclusive, this study was unable to 
achieve this goal. Although this research did not reveal relationships between the 
variables tested, it can inform how limitations of the study may have affected the results. 
Finally, an experimental redesign that may mitigate these limitations is proposed.  
Limitations of this Study  
One of the limitations of this study was having insufficient power to achieve 
statistical significance. Given the obtained effect sizes, it is possible that the effect size 
was overestimated during the power analysis and the actual effect is much smaller, 
meaning that the sample size used in this study was too small to observe the actual effect. 
It is also possible that the participant pool itself may have been mismatched to the 
practitioner-focused area of cyber security examined in this study. Intrusion detection and 
threat escalation are professional cyber security activities. The participants in this study 
were not cyber security practitioners. This incongruence was deliberate, yet expected to 
yield interpretable results. SJSU General Psychology students were chosen as the primary 
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participant pool for this study instead of cyber security practitioners because unlike 
practitioners, the participants were readily available. Cyber security practitioners are 
more inaccessible due to the nature of their profession. Some of these reasons include: 
the secrecy and security limitations of their work, the time it would take to participate, 
and the lack of resources for appropriate compensation. Using SJSU students afforded the 
ability to bypass some of these limitations.  
The partial eta squares reported indicate relatively small effect sizes. Combined with 
the relatively high self-reported task difficulty scores and low self-reported ratings of 
cyber security domain knowledge, the findings suggest that a floor effect may have 
obscured the ability to observe differences between conditions. Steps were taken to make 
the task more appropriate for this population. Extensive piloting resulted in the 
development of contingencies in the form of more explicit instructions, longer and more 
rigorous training exercises, reduced workload, and simplified SAGAT questions. The 
ultimate task that was developed shares little overlap with the professional task. Thus, 
simplified task simulations may not be effective. Despite efforts to combat task difficulty, 
the results suggest that the task was too difficult for participants to understand and 
complete with their available domain knowledge. Future iterations of the study should 
include stronger manipulations in the form of more robust SAGAT questions. Longer and 
more rigorous training may be required unless the task is simplified or modified to be 
more familiar to participants from this population.  
Another possible explanation for the small effect size could be that the constructs 
examined in this study do not operate in the same manner in the domain of cyber security 
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as they do in other domains in human factors. It is possible that the decisions in CND and 
the CSA required to make them differ from other human-machine systems examined in 
previous literature. The likely floor effects would obscure observation of this possibility. 
Future research that reduce floor effects could provide more insight into this possible 
problem by allowing better observation into human decision making in CND.  
As most participants rated themselves relatively low on cyber security domain 
knowledge, it is possible that participants were not lacking in understanding of cyber 
security. Perhaps, how end users conceptualize cyber security was misaligned with the 
task they were asked to perform. That being said, it is possible to examine the influences 
of level of automation and automation reliability on human CSA in this domain with this 
participant pool. These constructs could be transformed and applied in a way that is not 
based on intrusion detection. Rather, a task that is more grounded in the day to day lives 
of end users, which might include being safe in the mobile, computer, and online worlds. 
Participants reported being relatively confident in their knowledge on these subjects. That 
knowledge could be applied to a typical behavior that end users engage in everyday, such 
as checking emails and evaluating the strategies involved in avoiding exploitation in the 
form of phishing attempts.  
Proposed Modified Study Design 
To adjust the study and compensate for the misalignment, the study could be revised 
by changing the nature of the task to something more relevant to the daily tasks of the 
population. For example, participants could perform a phishing email detection task with 
a Gmail simulation in conjunction with an automated feature that helps flag phishing 
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attempts and bring them to the attention of the user. In this instance, the level of 
automation could be varied by the extent to which the automation is involved in decision 
making around determining whether or not a suspicious email is a phishing attempt. In 
one condition it could send a small notification indicating that the email seems different 
than one the user typically receives. For example, an email from a sender that is not 
recognized in your contacts. In another, it could send it to a spam folder without notifying 
the user. In the last condition, it could send to the spam folder and notify the user. 
Reliability could be manipulated similarly to the current study, in that it varies the errors 
the automation makes by flagging non-phishing emails at different rates (60%, 80%, 
95%). CSA would be evaluated from a performance-based measure similar to the current 
study with signal detection d’ calculated from a ratio of hits (ability to detect a phishing 
email) to false alarms (flagging a non-phishing email). Responses would be recorded by 
clicking a button to flag as phishing and notify the service provider. Responses would be 
attached directly to the email that inspired the click by aligning the timestamps, which 
will ensure that the response can be coded with a specific signal to improve accuracy of 
the analysis. 
A simulated Gmail account could be created through a user interface prototyping tool. 
These tools create a series of interconnected static screens that can simulate interactivity 
similar to a flipbook. When these prototypes are fully constructed and completely 
interconnected, a simulation of fully interactive task environments can be created. 
Participants will be able to click on any email or folder in this environment as though it 
were a real account. Participants could be given a hypothetical scenario for the study. 
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Participants could be told that over summer vacation their SJSU email account has 
received hundreds of messages they had neglected to check. The first email in the inbox 
could be from the SJSU email administrator informing participants that a new automated 
phishing email detection system has been implemented on SJSU email accounts. To test 
this new system, fake phishing email attempts increased in prevalence over the summer. 
All students should go through their inbox to identify these attempts along with this 
system.  
A SAGAT could also be performed examining the perception and comprehension 
elements of CSA about the phishing attempts. While participants click through the 
simulated inbox, the simulation could freeze after a certain number of clicks. This 
number of clicks could be randomized through the programing of the simulation. The 
click could bring participants to one of the interconnected nodes. These would be a blank 
screen with a SAGAT question and a continue button. Participants could log their 
response and click continue to bring them back to the inbox screen.  
SAGAT questions might include perception level elements of end user CSA. For 
example, these questions could ask: how many phishing emails have been detected so 
far? What is the current status of your inbox? Questions could also include 
comprehension elements, which would require participants to integrate multiple 
perception level elements together or explain in more detail how they are distinguishing 
phishing emails from non-phishing emails. Questions of this nature might include: how 
many phishing emails have been detected since the last non-phishing email you found? 
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At what time was the most recent phishing email detected? What clue tipped you off to 
the last phishing email?   
This new experimental design should address some of the issues with task difficulty 
and construct validity in this current study. Changing the nature of the task from intrusion 
detection to identifying email phishing techniques will ground the detection of cyber 
threats in something familiar to the end user. SJSU students should be able to conduct 
this task more effectively and accurately, which will likely dissipate floor effects and 
allow for more visibility into how the level of automation and automation reliability 
interact to moderate CSA in end user cyber hygiene practices. 
Conclusion 
As reported, the analyses were not significant. This study could not observe any main 
effects or interactions effects across type of automation or the reliability conditions for 
both percent correct of SAGAT scores and performance scores. This study could not 
ascertain the extent to which intrusion detections systems and reliability moderate CSA in 
CND. The scores for confidence and difficulty suggest a Dunning-Kruger effect in which 
participants felt confident going into the task, but found it very difficult by the time it was 
completed. This finding suggests that the training program may have been insufficient to 
prepare participants for a task that was too difficult for them to perform.  
The relatively high self-reported knowledge ratings for mobile, computer and internet 
usage when compared with lower ratings for cyber security related knowledge suggest 
that participants may have had insufficient domain knowledge to perform the task 
successfully. However, it is also possible that participants’ knowledge was mismatched 
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with the practitioner focused cyber security task in this study. Modifying the task to be 
more aligned with the knowledge base of the participant pool may lead to more 
successful observations in future iterations of this study.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
   
  
References 
Aydın, M. A., Zaim, A. H., & Ceylan, K. G. (2009). A hybrid intrusion detection system 
 design for computer network security. Computers & Electrical 
 Engineering, 35(3), 517-526. 
Bronte, R. N. (2016). A Framework for Hybrid Intrusion Detection Systems. 
 (Unpublished master’s thesis). Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, GA. 
Champion, M. A., Rajivan, P., Cooke, N. J., & Jariwala, S. (2012). Team-based cyber 
 defense analysis. In Cognitive Methods in Situation Awareness and Decision 
 Support (CogSIMA), 2012 IEEE International Multi-Disciplinary Conference, 
 218-221. IEEE. 
D'Amico, A., Whitley, K., Tesone, D., O'Brien, B., & Roth, E. (2005). Achieving cyber 
 defense situational awareness: A cognitive task analysis of information assurance 
 analysts. In Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual 
 Meeting, 49(3), 229-233. Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications. 
Dexter, F., Willemsen-Dunlap, A., & Lee, J. D. (2007). Operating room managerial 
 decision-making on the day of surgery with and without computer 
 recommendations and status displays. Anesthesia & Analgesia, 105(2), 419-429. 
Dixon, S. R., Wickens, C. D., & McCarley, J. S. (2006). How do automation false alarms and 
 misses affect operator compliance and reliance? Proceedings of the Human Factors 
 and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting, 50(1), 25-29. Santa Monica, CA: Human 
 Factors and Ergonomics Society. 
Dixon, S. R., Wickens, C. D., & McCarley, J. S. (2007). On the independence of 
 compliance and reliance: Are automation false alarms worse than misses?. Human 
 Factors, 49(4), 564-572. 
Endsley, M. R. (1988). Situation awareness global assessment technique (SAGAT). IEEE 
 1988 National Aerospace and Electronics Conference, (3), 789-795. doi: 
 10.1109/NAECON.1988.195097 
Endsley, M. R. (1988). Design and evaluation for situation awareness enhancement. 
 In Proceedings of the Human Factors Society annual meeting, 32(2), 97-101). 
 Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications. 
Endsley, M. R. (1995). Toward a theory of situation awareness in dynamic systems. Human 
 Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 37(1), 32-64. 
 doi:10.1518/001872095779049543 
42 
   
  
Endsley, M. R. (2000a). Direct measurement of situation awareness: Validity and use of 
 SAGAT. In M. R. Endsley & D. J. Garland (Eds.), Situation Awareness Analysis and 
 Measurement, (pp.147-173). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Endsley, M. R. (2000b). Theoretical underpinnings of situational awareness: A critical 
 review. In M. R. Endsley & D. J. Garland (Eds.), Situation Awareness Analysis and 
 Measurement, 3-32. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Flach, J. M. (2015). Situation awareness: Context matters! A commentary on 
 Endsley. Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making, 9(1), 59-72. 
Goodrich, M. A., McLain, T. W., Anderson, J. D., Sun, J., & Crandall, J. W. (2007). 
 Managing autonomy in robot teams: Observations from four experiments. Paper 
 presented at the meeting of the ACM International Conference on Human-Robot 
 Interaction, Arlington, Virginia. 
Gutzwiller, R. S., Fugate, S., Sawyer, B. D., & Hancock, P. A. (2015). The human factors 
 of cyber network defense. In Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics 
 Society Annual Meeting, 59(1), 322-326. Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA: SAGE 
 Publications. 
Gutzwiller, R. S., Hunt, S. M., & Lange, D. S. (2016). A task analysis toward 
 characterizing cyber-cognitive situation awareness (CCSA) in cyber defense 
 analysts. In Cognitive Methods in Situation Awareness and Decision Support 
 (CogSIMA), 2016 IEEE International Multi-Disciplinary Conference on (pp. 14-
 20). IEEE. 
Harwood, K., Barnett, B., & Wickens, C. D. (1988). Situational awareness: A conceptual 
 and methodological framework. In Proceedings of the 11th Biennial Psychology 
 in the Department of Defense Symposium (pp. 23-7). 
Horrey, W. J., Wickens, C. D., Strauss, R., Kirlik, A., & Stewart, T. R. (2009). 
 Supporting situation asessment through attention guidance and diagnostic aiding: 
 The benefits and costs of display enhancement on judgment skill. In A. Kirlik 
 (Ed.), Adaptive Perspectives on Human-Technology Interaction: Methods and 
 Models for Cognitive Engineering and Human-computer Interaction (pp. 55-70). 
 Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. 
Horrey, W. J., & Wickens, C. D. (2001). Supporting battlefield situation assessment 
 through attention guidance and diagnostic aiding: A cost-benefit and depth of 
 processing analysis (Report No. ARL-01-16/FED-LAB-01-1). Savoy, IL: 
 Aviation Research Lab. 
Jajodia, S., Liu, P., Swarup, V., & Wang, C. (2010). Cyber situational awareness, 14. 
 New York, NY: Springer. 
43 
   
  
Kaber, D. B., Omal, E., & Endsley, M. (1999). Level of automation effects on telerobot 
 performance and human operator situation awareness and subjective 
 workload. Automation Technology and Human Performance: Current Research 
 and Trends, 165-170. 
Kaber, D. B., Onal, E., & Endsley, M. R. (2000). Design of automation for telerobots and 
 the effect on performance, operator situation awareness, and subjective 
 workload. Human Factors and Ergonomics in Manufacturing, 10(4), 409-430. 
Kemmerer, R. A., & Vigna, G. (2002). Intrusion detection: a brief history and 
 overview. Computer, 35(4), l27-l30. 
Kuchar, J. K. (1996). Methodology for alerting-system performance evaluation. Journal 
 of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics, 19(2), 438-444. 
Kim, G., Lee, S., & Kim, S. (2014). A novel hybrid intrusion detection method 
 integrating anomaly detection with misuse detection. Expert Systems with 
 Applications, 41(4), 1690-1700. 
Little, R. (1988). A Test of Missing Completely at Random for Multivariate Data with 
 Missing Values. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 83(404), 1198-
 1202. doi:10.2307/2290157 
Madhavan, P., & Phillips, R. R. (2010). Effects of computer self-efficacy and system 
 reliability on user interaction with decision support systems. Computers in Human 
 Behavior, 26(2), 199-204. 
Mahoney, S., Roth, E., Steinke, K., Pfautz, J., Wu, C., & Farry, M. (2010). A cognitive 
 task analysis for cyber situational awareness. In Proceedings of the Human 
 Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting, 54(4), 279-283. Sage CA: Los 
 Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications. 
McHugh, J., Christie, A., & Allen, J. (2000). Defending yourself: The role of intrusion 
 detection systems. IEEE Software, 17(5), 42-51. 
Mukkamala, S., Sung, A., & Abraham, A. (2005). Cyber security challenges: Designing 
 efficient intrusion detection systems and antivirus tools. Vemuri, V. Rao, 
 Enhancing Computer Security with Smart Technology, 125-163. 
Onwubiko, C. (2009). Functional requirements of situational awareness in computer 
 network security. In Intelligence and Security Informatics, 2009. ISI'09. IEEE 
 International Conference, (pp. 209-213). IEEE. 
44 
   
  
Onwubiko, C., & Owens, T. (2012). Review of situational awareness for computer 
 network defence. Situational Awareness in Computer Network Defense: 
 Principles, Methods and Applications, 1-9. 
Onwubiko, C. (2016). Understanding Cyber Situation Awareness. Intl. Journal on Cyber 
 Situational Awareness, 1(1). 
Parasuraman, R., & Riley, V. (1997). Humans and automation: Use, misuse, disuse, 
 abuse. Human Factors, 39(2), 230-253. 
Parasuraman, R., Hancock, P. A., & Olofinboba, O. (1997). Alarm effectiveness in 
 driver- centred collision-warning systems. Ergonomics, 40(3), 390-399. 
Parasuraman, R., Sheridan, T. B., & Wickens, C. D. (2000). A model for types and levels 
 of human interaction with automation. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and 
 Cybernetics-Part A: Systems and Humans, 30(3), 286-297. 
Parasuraman, R., Sheridan, T. B., & Wickens, C. D. (2008). Situation awareness, mental 
 workload, and trust in automation: Viable, empirically supported cognitive 
 engineering constructs. Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision 
 Making, 2(2), 140-160. 
Peddabachigari, S., Abraham, A., Grosan, C., & Thomas, J. (2007). Modeling intrusion 
 detection system using hybrid intelligent systems. Journal of Network and 
 Computer Applications, 30(1), 114-132. 
Rovira, E., McGarry, K., & Parasuraman, R. (2007). Effects of imperfect automation on 
 decision making in a simulated command and control task. Human Factors, 49(1), 
 76-87. 
Rudisill, M. (2000). Crew/automation interaction in space transportation systems: 
 Lessons learned from the glass cockpit. Hampton, VA: NASA Langley Research 
 Center. 
Ruff, H. A., Narayanan, S., & Draper, M. H. (2002). Human interaction with levels of 
 automation and decision-aid fidelity in the supervisory control of multiple 
 simulated unmanned air vehicles. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual 
 Environments, 11(4), 335-351. 
Sarter, N. B., & Schroeder, B. (2001). Supporting decision making and action selection 
 under time pressure and uncertainty: The case of in-flight icing. Human 
 Factors, 43(4), 573-583. 
Sawyer, B. D., Finomore, V. S., Funke, G. J., Mancuso, V. F., Funke, M. E., Matthews, 
 G., & Warm, J. S. (2014). Cyber Vigilance Effects of Signal Probability and 
45 
   
  
 Event Rate. In Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 
 Annual Meeting, 58(1), 1771-1775. 
Schlösser, T., Dunning, D., Johnson, K. L., & Kruger, J. (2013). How unaware are the 
 unskilled? Empirical tests of the “signal extraction” counterexplanation for the 
 Dunning–Kruger effect in self-evaluation of performance. Journal of Economic 
 Psychology, 39, 85-100. 
Schuster, D. (2013). The effects of diagnostic aiding on situation awareness under robot 
 unreliability. (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). University of Central Florida, 
 Orlando, FL.  
Sheridan, T. B., & Verplank, W. L. (1978). Human and computer control of undersea 
 teleoperators. Man-Machine Systems Lab Report. Massachusetts Inst. of Tech, 
 Cambridge, MA.  
Singh, A. L., Tiwari, T., & Singh, I. L. (2009). Effects of automation reliability and 
 training on automation-induced complacency and perceived mental 
 workload. Journal of the Indian Academy of Applied Psychology, 35(2009), 9-22. 
Swets, J. A., & Pickett, R. M. (1982). Evaluation of diagnostic systems: methods from 
 signal detection theory. New York, NY: Academic Press.  
Tesfahun, A., & Bhaskari, D. L. (2015). Effective hybrid intrusion detection system: A 
 layered approach. International Journal of Computer Network and Information 
 Security, 7(3), 35. 
Werlinger, R., Hawkey, K., Muldner, K., Jaferian, P., & Beznosov, K. (2008). The 
 challenges of using an intrusion detection system: is it worth the effort?. 
 In Proceedings of the 4th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (pp. 107-
 118). ACM. 
Wickens, C. D., & Dixon, S. R. (2007). The benefits of imperfect diagnostic automation: 
 A synthesis of the literature. Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science, 8(3), 201-
 212. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
   
  
Appendix A 
SanJosé State University Office of Research 
TEL: 408-924-2272 Division of One 
Washington Square officeofresearch@sjsu.edu 
Academic Affairs San José, CA 95192-0025 
sjsu.edu/research  
  
  
SAN JOSE STATE UNIVERSITY  
HUMAN SUBJECTS INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD  
IRB Notice of Approval  
Date of Approval: 1/8/2018  
Study Title: A Comparative Study of the Influence of Level 
Automation and Reliability of IDS Systems on Cyber Situation Awareness  
  
Primary Investigator(s): Dr. David Schuster  
Student(s): Ian Cooke  
Other Team Members: Pilar Bianchi, Kristina Devtyan, Elizabeth 
Shallal  
Funding Source: National Science Foundation  
IRB Protocol Tracking Number: S17162  
Type of Review   
47 
   
  
☒   Exempt Registration: Category of approval §46.104(d)(2ii)  
☐   Expedited Review: Category of approval §46.110(a)()  
☐   Full Review   
☐   Modifications  
☐   Continuing Review  
  
Special Conditions   
☒   Waiver of signed consent approved  
☐   Waiver of some or all elements of 
informed consent approved ☐   Risk 
determination for device: N/A ☐   Other:   
Continuing Review   
☒   Is not required. Principal Investigator must file a status report 
with the Office of Research one year from the approval date on this notice to 
communicate whether the research activity is ongoing. Failure to file a 
status report will result in closure of the protocol and destruction of the 
protocol file after three years.  
  
     
☐   Is required. An annual continuing review renewal application 
must be submitted to the Office of Research one year from the approval date 
on this notice. No human subjects research can occur after this date without 
continuing review and approval.  
48 
   
  
Approved by Dr. Pamela C. Stacks  
Associate Vice President  
Institutional Official  
Office of Research   
San Jose State University  
IRB Contact   
Alena Filip  
Human Protections Analyst  
408-924-2479  
Alena.Filip@sjsu.edu  
Primary Investigator Responsibilities  
• Any significant changes to the research must be submitted for 
review and approval prior to the implementation of the changes.  
• Reports of unanticipated problems, injuries, or adverse events 
involving risks to participants must be submitted to the IRB within 
seven calendar days of the primary investigator’s knowledge of the 
event.  
• If the continuing review section of this notice indicates that 
continuing review is required, a request for continuing review must 
be submitted prior to the date the provided.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49 
   
  
Appendix B 
REQUEST FOR YOUR PARTICPATION IN RESEARCH 
TITLE OF THE STUDY 
The Effect of Level of Automation and Reliability of IDS Systems on Cyber Situation 
Awareness  
NAME OF THE RESEARCHER  
Principle Investigator: Ian Cooke San Jose State University graduate student 
Faculty Advisor: Dr. David Schuster PhD.  
PURPOSE  
The purpose of this research is to identify how and/or to what extent the level of 
automation and the reliability of intrusion detection systems influences the ability for human 
computer network defenders to successfully recognize cyberattacks. 
PROCEDURES  
Upon signing this agreement, you will be asked to conduct a quick survey about your basic 
characteristics (gender, age, etc.) and your knowledge of computers and cyber security. After that, 
you’ll sit in front of a laptop computer and step into the role of a network defender and search 
through network traffic and identify cyberattacks with the help of our intrusion detection system 
simulator. You’ll start by performing a 10 minute training exercise to help you get familiar with 
the task. When you’re ready, you’ll then perform the main task in one 10 minute section. Finally, 
you’ll be debriefed and given credit upon completion of the experiment.  
POTENTIAL RISKS  
There are no potential risks beyond those incurred during normal interaction with a 
computer. 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS  
There are no direct benefits to you by participating in this research beyond course credit. 
However, your participation will contribute to our knowledge of cyber security and may lead to 
safer networks in the future.  
COMPENSATION  
Should you choose to participate, you will be compensated with one hour of Sona 
credit toward your Introduction to Psychology course requirement. You also have the 
option of completing an alternative assignment for credit in supplement of or in 
conjunction with this study. The details of this assignment are located on the San Jose 
State research pool website at the following link:  
http://www.sjsu.edu/psych/Undergraduates/subjectpool.html 
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In addition to earning credit for your course, research participation gives you hands-
on experience with the psychological research process and introduces you to techniques 
that may be useful for a career in psychology. It also allows you to contribute to the 
scientific study of mind, brain, and behavior. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY  
You will be represented by a number throughout the study. The only record we will 
have of participation will be the signed informed consent document. The informed 
consent document will not be linked to your data once it has been collected.  
Informed consent documents will be kept in the lab behind a locked door and/or in 
David Schuster’s locked office. Data without identifying marks will be shared within the 
research team. 
 
PARTICIPANT RIGHTS  
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You can refuse to participate in the 
entire study or any part of the study without any negative effect on your relations with San Jose 
State University. You also have the right to skip any question you do not wish to answer. This 
consent form is not a contract. It is a written explanation of what will happen during the study if 
you decide to participate. You will not waive any rights if you choose not to participate, and there 
is no penalty for stopping your participation in the study.  
QUESTIONS OR PROBLEMS  
You are encouraged to ask questions at any time during this study.  
• For further information about the study, please contact Ian Cooke [email: 
iacooke@sjsu.edu] 
• Complaints about the research may be presented to Lynda Heiden [email: 
Lynda.heiden@sjsu.edu]   
• For questions about participants’ rights or if you feel you have been harmed in any way 
by your participation in this study, please contact Dr. Pamela Stacks, Associate Vice President of 
the Office of Research, San Jose State University, at 408-924-2479.  
 
SIGNATURES   
Your signature indicates that you voluntarily agree to be a part of the study, that the details 
of the study have been explained to you, that you have been given time to read this document, and 
that your questions have been answered. You will receive a copy of this consent form for your 
records.  
 
Participant Signature  
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_____________________________ 
____________________________________________________ Participant’s Name (printed) 
Participant’s Signature Date  
 
Researcher Statement  
I certify that the participant has been given adequate time to learn about the study and ask 
questions. It is my opinion that the participant understands his/her rights and the purpose, risks, 
benefits, and procedures of the research and has voluntarily agreed to participate.  
___________________________________________________________________
__________________ Signature of Person Obtaining Informed Consent Date. 
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Appendix C 
Protocol for Ian’s Thesis Study 
Setting up a SONA researcher account 
Email someone about this and she’ll get you signed up.  
She should give you a username and password to login. You can change this when 
you get in. 
Your student email should be your login and you’ll have to make a password. 
Once you’re in your account, I’ll put you as admins on my study so you should be 
able to see it.  
Putting up study sessions to SONA 
Once you have your account and you’re on my study, you should be able to see it 
under the “my studies” page.  
You can click on my study name and it will give you details about the study. 
To add timeslots: (you’ll have some liberty here) 
1. Click the timeslot button on next to my study name on the “my studies” page. 
You’ll be able to see a list of all the available previous, scheduled timeslots and who is 
running them when.  
2. You can add one or multiple slots (tabs up at the top.) 
3. Specify number of slots 
4. write the date of the study 
5. Specify the time 
6. free time between slots is for multiple (just if you want a break in between) 
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7. Participants per slot will always be 3 (number of computers we have to run) 
8. Specify the location of your lab space you selected so your participant knows 
where to go 
9. click add and you’re done! 
 
On the day…Set up the stuff (BEFORE THE PARTICIPANT ARRIVES) 
Make sure you bring all three laptops and the master flash drive with you. It will 
always be in a backpack on the back shelf. DOUBLE CHECK TO MAKE SURE IT”S 
ALL THERE. There are three laptops, chargers, and one master flash drive. 
1. Turn on all laptops. Make sure they are all plugged in to the wall.  
 
2. Get online and set up the Qualtrics preliminary survey. This is in the VECTR Lab 
qualtics account. (let me know if you don’t have access) The survey will be called: Ian’s 
Thesis Demographic Survey 
 
3. Open the folder on the desktop called Ian’s Experiment.  
Run the log viewer program for the training condition (check the participant sheet 
excel document to see the participant number and version ID. Make sure these all match 
up and load the proper version)  
Make sure that the participant number you put in corresponds to what version 
you’re supposed to open on the sheet.  
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4. Have consent forms set up for each participant. 
Write the participant number and the condition ID on the top right corner of each 
one.  
Cross reference the spreadsheet to make sure everything is right. 
 
5. Open the Participant list and test condition study spreadsheet and write down the 
participant’s name, gender, age etc. next to the participant number and test condition 
they’re in. DOUBLE CHECK AGAIN TO MAKE SURE EVERYTHING IS RIGHT 
AND LINES UP. 
 
Running the study 
1. Bring participant into the shared data collection space (room specification will be 
up to you) 
 
2. Have the participant read and sign the written consent form and make sure they 
understand everything. Be sure to ask them if they have any questions. 
 
3. Explain the basics of the experiment tell them you’ll be happy to discuss any of 
the details of the study and/or answer any questions in the debriefing session at the end of 
the experiment. Say this: 
“Thanks for participating in the study today. You will be put in the role of a cyber 
defender. You’ll be tasked with monitoring a network and identifying potential attacks 
for about 15 minutes. I’ll explain in more detail momentarily and if you have any 
questions about the nature of the study, I’ll be happy to answer them at the end. But first, 
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please take our preliminary survey so we can learn a bit about you and your familiarity 
with computers and technology.”  
4. Have the participant take the preliminary survey and log their responses (it 
should do this automatically when they’re done, but double check) 
 
5. Explain the instructions of the participant.  
“OK, thanks for doing the survey, now we’re going to get you trained on the task. 
You’ll be watching a log simulation of network traffic. Your task is to correctly identify 
the potential hacks to the network. Highlight the most recent log presented. If it’s an 
attack, hit notify. If it isn’t, hit pass. It’s important to keep track of the attacks and 
distractors to distinguish them, so try to pay close attention to the timestamps of the 
attacks and distractors, and how many have occurred.  
There are 3 types of attacks: Viruses, Worms, and Brutes. Viruses are indicated by a 
log called Item deleted, Worms are indicated by message sent to user #, and brutes are 
indicated by unknown user login. We’ll do a little practice session to get you used to 
everything. Any questions?”  
Once you’re done explaining load the training session and tell them to click begin 
whenever they’re ready. Inform them to ask questions and to tell you when they’re done 
with the training.  
Stay with them while they’re completing their training and guide them through the 
process. Do your best to answer any questions they have about the task or the program.  
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When they’re done, ask if they have any questions. Also, ask them how they feel 
about everything and gauge their confidence. There’s nothing we can do, but it would just 
be good to know.  
 
6. Load the actual trial. Double check the sheet to make sure it’s the right condition.  
In the analysis only condition, cover the data log on the lefthand side with some 
paper. 
Input the proper participant number in the box and hit enter.  
Tell the participant to click OK begin whenever he/she is ready. 
 
7. At three times during the session, the program will freeze and leave to another 
screen. When this happens, randomly choose one of the SAGAT question printed out and 
hand it to the participant.  
Give them a minute to write a response or give up.  
Make sure you write the participant number on the top right of the page and set it 
aside.   
 
8. Be sure to pay attention to any peculiar things about the study (e.g. did the 
participant have a problem with something? Did the logviewer glitch? Was someone 
extra confused? Any idiosyncratic things)  
When you observe anything like this, be sure to mention it in the comments.  
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Open the Participant list and test condition excel sheet where you logged the 
participant’s name age gender etc. and write anything strange in that comment section.  
 
Finishing the study 
1. When the participant has finished, ask them “on a scale of 1 – 10 1 being 
extremely easy and 10 being extremely difficult how would you rate the difficulty of this 
task. Have them write their response on the spreadsheet.  
 
2. When participants finish the survey, ask them if they have any questions. If they 
don’t, tell them you will give them credit as soon as they leave and tell them they are free 
to go. Thank them for their time. 
 
3. For those that are curious, say the following:  
“We looking to improve the situation awareness of computer network defenders. 
We’re varying the reliability of the automation and the extent to which the automation is 
involved in the task to see if we can optimize which combination will increase SA the 
most and produce the most successful outcome.” 
 
4. Ask them if they have any further questions. Do your best to answer them, but 
“I’m not sure” is an acceptable response if you don’t know.  
 
Finishing the studies for the day 
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When you’re all done with running your sessions there’s going to be some clean up 
work to do… 
1. The data is all stored locally on each computer. You’re going to have to take the 
master flash drive and download all of the recent sessions off of the “experiment logs” 
data folder.  
2. Clean up any mess you or your participants made while you were there and make 
sure the door is locked when you leave. We need to leave these shared data spaces in 
better conditions than we found them. Remember that you’re representing VECTR lab. 
3. Grab everything you brought with you and bring it back to the lab 
4. Plug the flashdrive into one of the computers and upload all of the data to my 
master data folder in my Ian’s thesis 2018 folder on the VECTR team drive. 
5. Put all equipment (computers, chargers, and master flashdrive) back to the 
backpack where you found it on the shelf.  
6. make sure you return whatever key to whatever room back to the psych office 
and the lab key when you’re done. 
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Appendix D 
Ian's Thesis Demographic Survey 
 
 
Start of Block: Default Question Block 
 
Q10  
Hi there! 
 
Thanks for your participation in thus study! The following preliminary survey is intended 
to gather basic demographic information about you and your level of comfort with 
computers, technology and security. When you're ready, please click below to begin. 
Have fun! 
 
 
Page 
Break 
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End of Block: Default Question Block  
Start of Block: Default Question Block 
 
 
Q4 Age 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Q5 Sex 
o Male  (1)  
o Female  (2)  
o Choose not answer  (3)  
 
 
 
Q6 On a scale of 1-9 (with 1 being not knowledgeable and 9 being very 
knowledgeable), how would you rate your level of aptitude with computers? 
Computer Aptitude (1) 
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Q7 On a scale of 1-9 (with 1 being not knowledgeable and 9 being very 
knowledgeable), how would you rate your level of aptitude with mobile technology? 
Mobile Technology Aptitude (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
Q8 On a scale of 1-9 (with 1 being not knowledgeable and 9 being very 
knowledgeable), how would you rate your level of aptitude with internet usage? 
Internet Usage Aptitude (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
Q9 On a scale of 1-9 (with 1 being not knowledgeable and 9 being very 
knowledgeable), how would you rate your level of confidence in cyber security? 
Cyber Security Confidence (1) 
 
 
 
End of Block: Default Question Block  
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Appendix E 
 
SAGAT Questions 
• How many worms have been detected at this point? 
• How many brutes have been detected at this point? 
• How many viruses have been detected at this point? 
• At what time was the most recent Virus detected? 
• At what time was the most recent Brute detected? 
• How many new users have registered since the last virus was detected? 
• How many users have logged in since the last brute was detected? 
• How many user messages have been sent to other users since the last worm was 
detected?  
• At what time was the most recent worm detected? 
• How many users have logged out since the last brute was detected? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
